GATT rules and disciplines. (1) The integration was planned in stages. In Phase 1, on 1 January 1995, each party to the agreement was to integrate products into the GATT from the specific list of textiles and apparel products in the Agreement, which accounted for not less than 16% of a country's total volume of imports in 1990. Integration' meant that trade in these products would be governed by the general rules of GATT. At the beginning of Phase 2, on 1 January 1998, products that accounted for not less than an additional 17% of 1990 imports were integrated. On 1 January 2002 products that accounted for not less than an additional 18% of 1990 imports were integrated. All remaining products are to be integrated at the end of the transition period, on 1 January 2005.
The effects of this agreement to liberalize trade by removing all quotas on apparel trade by 2005 have been, and continue to be, nothing short of revolutionary for the industry. (2) The North American and European apparel sectors have experienced dramatic transformations in their organization, linkages, and geographies as production has been relocated to proximate, lower cost, regions (either through direct investment or through out-sourcing). In North America, for example, global liberalization of apparel and textiles has been accompanied by increasing regional integrationölargely through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)öas delocalization has shifted apparel production from the United States to Mexico and other countries in Central America and the Caribbean Basin (see Gereffi et al, 2002; Kessler, 1999; Smith et al, 2002 for fuller discussions). In Europe, the former communist economies of EastĈ entral Europe (ECE) and selected countries in the Mediterranean Basin, such as Turkey, have become major suppliers to the European Union (EU) market Pellegrin, 2001a ).
An understanding of these changing geographies of European and Mediterranean Basin apparel production and trade also, however, requires attention to the increasing process of economic integration within the pan-European region itself, and the accompanying trade liberalization that underpins it. Two primary processes are involved here. The first is the role of the preferential trade arrangements with the EU applicant states from East^Central Europe (ECE) and the Mediterranean Basin. Of particular importance are the Europe Agreements signed in the early 1990s with the ten ECE states seeking to join the EU. These agreements embodied a commitment to the creation of a free-trade zone with the EU. The textiles and apparel sector was recognized early on as a sensitive sector for full-scale liberalization, especially given its significance for production and employment within the EU. Consequently, separate protocols were signed between the EU member states and each applicant state to regulate a gradual liberalization of textiles and clothing. Initially aimed at tariff removal in the early years of the 21st century, the agreements were later revised to allow for virtually full liberalization by 1 January 1998. The shortening of the period within which liberalization was to occur was driven, in part, by a desire on behalf of the EU to demonstrate to the applicant states a continuing commitment to integration and their eventual membership during a period in which negotiations and progress on accession talks were slow. The second process involves a series of bilateral preferential trade arrangements with third countries, among them the (1) See http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/ursum e.htm#cAgreement (2) The European Union and the USA have each been accused of slowing down the process of liberalization in order to protect their own textile and apparel industries, particularly by`backloading' the process by selecting products to be liberalized in the first three phases of the ATC that were the`least sensitive' for their domestic industries and that played a relatively minor role in global trade (Brugnolli and Resmini, 1996) . Equally, other barriers to trade, such as antidumping practices, are likely to limit the complete liberalization of the apparel sector even after 2005.
EU customs union with Turkey introduced in 1996 as a prelude to Turkey's possible eventual EU accession (see Tan, 2001) .
In this paper we document the changing trade patterns in the apparel industry in Europe within the context of these dynamic global and European regulatory arrangements. We give particular attention to the effects of new out-sourcing practices and trends on the six most important exporting countries of East^Central Europe, referred to here as`ECE6' (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), as well as the countries in the Mediterranean Basin and elsewhere in ECE. We argue that during the 1990s producers in ECE played a very particular set of roles in EU apparel sourcing, and that understanding why the countries of the ECE6 have come to play these roles requires an appreciation both of the sourcing strategies of EU buyers and retailers and of the uneven geographical legacies of apparel production, capacities, and skills in the region which resulted from its soviet-style industrialization (see also Grabher and Stark, 1997; Smith, 1998; Smith and Pickles, 1998) . One consequence has been that, from the 1980s onwards, the existing fabric of ECE6 production and links through out-sourcing and subcontracting provided essential preconditions for the dramatic industrial transformation witnessed in the apparel sector during the past thirteen years following the collapse of communism. We chart these key changes, drawing on trade data between the EU and selected economies derived from the Comext database (Eurostat, 2001 ) and on interviews with EU-based retailers.
Going global? The expansion of East^Central European and Mediterranean Basin apparel production and exports in the 1990s
If the decade of the 1980s was marked by the growth of the Asian apparel industry, based on export platforms to supply global markets in North America, Western Europe, and Japan, in particular, the 1990s have been marked by more complex geographical processes of sourcing, production, and trade. In this reworking of sourcing strategies, individual buying and retailing companies operate under intense competitive pressures, optimizing specific commodity chains and contracting arrangements based on their own position in supplying categories, styles, and quality of clothing to specific markets. The intensification of competition has also increased as a result of WTO and EU trade-liberalization policies that have, literally, provided a planned opening of the geographical field within which these specific strategies could be developed. For example, one consequence of the ATC, combined with the increased flexibility of the apparel industry in core markets which resulted from the shortening of fashion cycles and the intensity of competition amongst retailers [what Abernathy et al (1999) refer to as`lean retailing'], andöeven more recentlyöthe Asian currency crisis of 1997, has been a rapid reorientation of the geographies of sourcing for major markets. Gereffi (1999) has shown how US buyers and retailers have deepened their sourcing strategies from the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (see also Gereffi et al, 2002) . Gereffi (1999) and Dicken and Hassler (2000) have also shown successive shifts of assembly production from Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to China and Southeast Asia. Others have pointed to a similar deepening of regional sourcing for the EU, from producers in ECE and North Africa (Begg et al, 1999; Dunford et al, 2002; Graziani, 1998; Pickles and Begg, 2000; Smith, 2003) . In this section we focus on the role of the larger EU countries as they have reorientated their sourcing, showing how their strategies have reconfigured the geographies of production and trade throughout ECE and the Mediterranean Basin.
Between 1989 and 2000 the ECE and North African/Southern Mediterranean's closest competitors, the major Asian suppliers of China and Hong Kong, did not increase their combined share of EU apparel imports (22.6% in 1989 and 22.2% in 2000) (table 1, over). But, the secondary offshoring by the wealthier Asian economies öwhat Gereffi (1999) calls`triangular manufacturing'öhalved Hong Kong's share of the EU market, and led to significant simultaneous growth in China's share. Among the top ten suppliers to this market, ECE and the Mediterranean countries increased their share of EU apparel imports from 26.8% in 1989 to 30.8% in 2000, with Romania, Tunisia, Morocco, and Poland being the largest suppliers from the region. Combined ECE and Mediterranean apparel exports to the EU rose from 37% to 44.2% of the total between 1989 and 2000, 80% of this increase coming from ECE countries (15.2% of EU apparel imports in 1989 to 20.9% in 2000, or 1138 million ECU to 7123 million ECU, respectively (figure 1).
However, these broad regional patterns mask more complex subregional differences. Figure 2 indicates the relative role played by different exporting countries in total EU apparel imports between 1990 and 2000. (3) Some striking patterns are evident. During this ten-year period both China and Turkey became core players: in each case, apparel imports from them increased to more than 10% of total EU apparel imports, whereas the relative importance of Hong Kong declined to just under 7% of total EU apparel imports. Over the same period, the majority of countries in North East Asia and half of those in South East Asia experienced a reduction in their share of total EU apparel imports. ECE producers have becomeöwith the exception of the former Yugoslaviaömuch more important sources for the EU apparel market during the 1990s. Total exports to EU by category Year 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Figure 1 . Total apparel exports from ECE6 countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) to the EU, 1989^2000 (source: Eurostat, 2001 ).
(3) The position of a country in figure 2 indicates its relative share of EU apparel imports in these two time periods. A decline in share may not correspond to a fall in absolute imports by the EU. Inspiration for this figure comes from Gereffi (1999 was the relocation of contracting away from the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s at the time of the breakup of the federal state and the descent into violence. In addition to these changing overall patterns of apparel trade between ECE and the EU there are clear patterns of sourcing between EU member states and particular ECE producing countries. Table 2 shows the changing pattern of trade between the six most important apparel suppliers in ECE and the main EU member state markets, expressed as percentages of total apparel exports to the EU from these six ECE countries. The row totals show the percentage of total ECE6 apparel exports from individual ECE countries to the EU. Of all apparel exports to the EU from ECE6, Poland's apparel exports to Germany were by far the largest, accounting for 19.2% of all apparel exports from this group of countries to the EU in 1989.
Although each of the ECE6 exporting countries have shown an absolute gain in apparel exports to the EU, and all EU countries have increased their apparel imports from the ECE, there are relative winners and losers. Germany accounted for 60% of all apparel imports from the ECE6 in 1989, but its share fell to 44% by 2000. Italy imported only about 7% of its total apparel imports from the ECE6 in 1989, but by 2000 this had risen to 17%. Equally, Poland and Hungary have lost share while the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania have gained share. Among trading pairs, the Romania^Italy connection shows the greatest growth and Hungary^Germany the greatest decline. Among the ECE6, Bulgaria and Slovakia have benefited most by this relative reorientation of trade. More generally, these data indicate important reorientations in the relative importance of EU sourcing and the patterns of offshore processing away from original core producers, such as Poland and Hungary, to newer producers in ECE such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania (and, more broadly, in the Mediterranean Basin). The recent emergence of Italian companies as buyers of apparel in ECEönotably from Romaniaöis particularly significant for Italian local and regional development, especially in the primary textile and apparel regions of the Third Italy and its surrounding areas. Graziani (1998) associates this with several factors: the decline of domestic consumption in Italy, increased global price competition, retail concentration within the EU, and the appreciation of the lira. Italian textile firms responded to these pressures in the 1990s by acquiring downstream apparel firms with offshoring experience. Thus Marzotto acquired the German firm Hugo Boss which had a lengthy experience of subcontracting in ECE, and Miroglio acquired a host of smaller firms in Germany and France with similar experience (Graziani, 1998, page 5) .
The apparel sector was not only a significant dynamic of trade growth between ECE and the EU during the 1990s, it also represented a large proportion of manufacturing employment and production in the region during the same period (table 3) . ECE and the Mediterranean Basin accounted for approximately 63% of the total employment in Total zonetextiles and apparel in the pan-European zone. The sector also accounted for between 10% and 15% of the total manufacturing employment in many ECE economies. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that in ECE countries the relative role of the apparel sector in national employment and output has increased, or at least stabilized, during the 1990s (table 4) (Pickles and Begg, 2000; Smith, 2003) . This is all the more remarkable given the overall large-scale contraction of manufacturing employment and output in the majority of these economies over the same period (Dunford, 1998; Smith, 1998) . In this sense, after also experiencing dramatic declines in the early 1990s, the apparel sector provided a resilient alternative to the dominant and sustained experience of deindustrialization in postsocialist ECE (Pickles, 2002) . In particular, the apparel sector provided employment for a largely feminized labour force. For example, a survey of Slovak apparel plants in 1999 revealed that female employment accounted for 84% of average total employment (see Smith, 2003) . However, the gendered nature of the labour force in ECE is in many respects different from that apparent in other global apparel production systems, such as in the Mexican maquiladora production facilities along the US border which, to a large extent, rely on migrant female labour. In ECE, a large proportion of production is undertaken in factories in which an already experienced female working class is employed, partly because of prior experience in the large former state-owned enterprises and their branch plants and workshops that tended to characterize models of soviet industrial organization (Pickles, 2002 ).
An important reason for the resurgence of apparel industries in ECE is related to the process of`economic involution' (Burawoy, 1996) and the deindustrialization it wrought after 1989. Western European buying and retailing firms had, as we shall see, established strong sourcing links with ECE producers during the 1980s (Begg et al, 1999; Dicken, 1998; Pickles, 2002; Pickles and Begg, 2000; Smith, 2003) . After 1989, already-low wage levels were effectively reduced both by currency exchange fluctuations and by overall economic decline. Declines in real and relative wages followed, resulting in new possibilities for EU manufacturers and retailers for subcontracting manufacturing to cash-strapped producers in ECE. The regulatory structures set up by the EU itself and the phasing in of the ATC provided further stimulus to tapping these low-wage, relatively skilled, labour pools. Yet this existing industrial fabric in ECE also allowed for particular forms of production and export to develop that did not necessarily involve low-value apparel products, unlike other producers in Asia. For example, the ECE6 producers exporting to the EU tend to specialize in a discrete and quite narrow range of apparel product categories, in which relatively highly skilled workers, produce relatively high-value men's and women's tailored garments (Begg et al, 2002) . In Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, for example, products such as men's and women's tailored suits and trousers accounted for nearly 50% of total apparel exports to the EU in 2000. Consequently, large-scale global apparel trade liberalization, as embodied in the ATC process, may not significantly threaten the particular niche that producers in ECE have been able to establish in these relatively high-value products. In order to understand this process of resurgence and stabilization of apparel production in ECE better, we turn now to the role of the EU's Outward Processing Trade or Traffic (OPT) regulations in the shaping of apparel out-sourcing across Europe.
Outward-processing trade and the reconfiguration of pan-European apparel production Global trade in textiles and apparel has been governed by special regimes since 1974. Under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) concluded under the GATT, countries were allowed to implement specific import restrictions (quotas) to safeguard domestic industry (see Glasmeier et al, 1993) . Such restrictions, however, have been a doubleedged sword. While sheltering domestic manufacturers in the USA and Western Europe from lower cost imports, they have also made them vulnerable to international competitors who are willing to seek offshore production locations. The labour-intensive nature of apparel manufacturing, the predominance of small firms, and the relatively low barriers to entry, especially in lower value apparel assembly, enabled the movement of production to lower wage countries throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Dicken, 1998; Gereffi, 1994) . Manufacturing competition from lower wage countries was exacerbated during the late 1980s and 1990s by the emergence of what Gereffi (1994; has called`buyer-driven' commodity chains. Under systems of`full-package' contracting, some large EU (and US) retailers became`factories without walls', restricting their domestic activities to design, marketing, and retailing and subcontracting the production processes to largely Asian suppliers. The combination of these two processes created significant pressure on EU manufacturers and retailers to follow suit. One compromise solution to this dilemma adopted in the EU was outward processing. Outward processing is both a production process and a specific vehicle for regulating that production process through trade and customs regimes. As a production process, outward processing' is used synonymously with offshore apparel assembly and contracted out-sourcing. As a cross-border production process, EU-based manufacturers, agents, or retailers contract producers in ECE to manufacture garments for reimport into the EU. As a production process this may involve the bundled supply of most inputs and components to the ECE producer, although it can also involve other forms of contract production in which greater levels of responsibility for the supply of inputs rests with the ECE producer. As a trade regime, outward-processing trade (OPT) is a system of production governed by EU trade regulations. (4) OPT as a trade regime between the EU and ECE takes two forms (see Economic Bulletin for Europe 1995, page 125; Pellegrin, 2001a) . The first is`fiscal OPT' or`tariff OPT', in which customs regulations established in the early 1980s and consolidated further in the early 1990s entirely suspended tariffs on the reimport of goods from ECE into the EU. As a formal customs agreement, no duties are levied when raw materials (such as textiles) are temporarily exported from the EU for processing undertaken in a third country and reimported into the same EU country as partially finished or fully finished goods. (5) Tariff OPT is, then, a more general and more broadly used mechanism for obtaining tax relief from customs duty available for nonquota commodities. Tariff relief is (4) Similar arrangements emerged in North America where is it known as`production sharing' or 807 production', referring to the clause of US trade laws that govern the process (see Bair and Gereffi, 2002; Glasmeier et al, 1993 available across a broad range of products and has been particularly important for apparel manufacturers and retailers in the EU.
The second form of OPT as a trade regime is known as`economic OPT', which consists of granting additional quota for the import into the EU of specific products produced from EU-originating materials. The EU initially argued for the introduction of OPT quotas under the MFA III (1982^86) (Economic Bulletin for Europe 1995). By carefully controlling the export, processing, and reimport of certain textile and clothing products under OPT, the EU attempted to manage the political and economic conflict between the potential loss of domestic employment in the clothing and textiles sector and the erosion of its global position in those industries to foreign competition. Between 1982 and 1986 the EU established a set of OPT quotas through bilateral agreements. (6) In 1994 the EU replaced the early 1980s bilateral agreements with EU regulation 3036/94, creating an EU-wide set of OPT quotas. One condition of obtaining the authorization for OPT was that offshore assembly operations by any one EU manufacturer within ECE could not substitute for more than half of that manufacturer's production within the EU. Any reduction of EU production would cause a reduction in quota authorization.
These early origins of ECE^EU outward processing shaped the present situation in a number of ways. As has been argued elsewhere (Pickles and Begg, 2000) , the collapse of command economies in 1989 was not the initiator either of market relationships between the ECE apparel producers and the EU, or of the export of textile and apparel products from ECE to Western countries. These sourcing practices and regulatory regimes existed prior to 1989 and had been shaped by the historical geography of textile and apparel trade established during the 1980s. First, out-sourcing to ECE suppliers during the 1980s was part of a larger wage-bill lowering strategy of the Northern European Community (EC) countries. As such, apparel assembly was moved not only to Asia and ECE countries, but also to southern European countries prior to them joining the EC. In this process, for example, Greece and Portugal because assembly platforms for Germany and the United Kingdom. Second, such positions of trade and production embodied in the early OPT legislation still shape relations between EU and ECE countries. As table 5 illustrates, the primary OPT sourcing countries between 1989 and 2000 were those in which EU contractors had established contacts in the early to mid-1980s. Poland, Romania, and Hungary were particularly important in ECE apparel assembly for the EU at this time. The single most important EU partner then and now was Germany, accounting for over 60% of all OPT imports from the ECE6 in 1989 (Pellegrin, 2001a, page 106) . As EU companies have adopted more generalized sourcing strategies across ECE, however, Romania and Bulgaria have grown in relative importance in OPT whereas the relative importance of the original core OPT producers, such as Poland and Hungary, has declined. In part, this is a response to the declining relative importance of Germany and the rapid increase of Italian offshoring, as noted earlier (table 2) .
Total EU OPT apparel imports from ECE6 increased rapidly in the early to mid1990s. In 1989 trade regime OPT accounted for 68% of total apparel exports from ECE to the EU, and this percentage increased to a peak of 82% of total apparel exports from ECE to the EU in 1996 (figure 3), although the particular role of OPT for various categories of apparel varied. Individual country's trade patterns differ in timing and amount, but for many ECE countries OPT accounts for an important primary and initial stimulus to trade growth. After 1996, the importance of ECE^EU trade under OPT regulations declined both absolutely and relatively as OPT quota benefits were phased out and full-scale liberalization of tariffs came into force. Consequently, EU firms shifted their contracting to normal trade. By 2000 trade-regime OPT had declined to 35% of total apparel exports from ECE countries to the EU. (7) Of course, the phasing out of OPT as a trade regime does not mean that outward processing as a set of cross-border production relations has ended. Indeed, the shift tò normal trade' has meant that, although the OPT regulatory regime has ended and is no longer recorded as such in the EU trade statistics, outward processing as a production process continues to be the largest part of ECE^EU apparel trade. Indeed, outward processing as a form of assembly production using imported fabric has continued at an increased rate as trade has been liberalized. For example,``In the first 9 months of 1998 production [from Bulgaria to Germany] was close to 1 million DM of which 632 millionöabout 60% öwas ishleme [or outward processing]'' (Obleklo Textil 1999, page 5), and outward processing continues to be important, as figures for Germany demonstrate. Table 6 (over) shows the distribution of Passiven Veredelungsverkehrs (PV), or offshore assembly production, for Germany in 2001 from the ECE6 countries. Offshore assembly still comprises more than 75% of total German apparel imports from these countries, and collectively the ECE6 account for more than half of the total offshore production of German firms. Interviews conducted in Bulgaria and Slovakia 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Year Figure 3 . OPT (outward processing traffic) as a percentage of the value of total EU apparel imports from East^Central Europe (source: Eurostat, 2001).
(7) The continuing role of OPT reported trade in these countries is explained by the fact that, even though quantitative restrictions on the import of apparel products ceased at the end of 1997, and OPT itself was phased out at the same time, the OPT category continues to record trade undertaken under Outward Processing Relief which gives duty relief on reimports of goods to the EU following outward processing in third countries. There are no quotas for such trade, but such trade can still occur under EU tax law. We are grateful to Bob Muse and Ve¨ronique Schneider of the European Commission SIGL Help Desk for clarifying this complexity.
also suggest that exports to Italy, France, Greece, Holland, and the United Kingdom continue to be dominated by cut^make^trim (CMT) production using materials imported from the EU. How did this process of liberalization occur? Between 1991 and 1995 the changed economic, cultural, and political landscape required a rewriting of the OPT regulations. The imminent demise of apparel and textile quotas as a protectionist device was spelled out in the ATC. Under these rules, all EU quotas were to be eliminated as a device for managing imports by 2005. As part of the trade liberalization dictated by the ATC, the EU progressively removed quotas on textile and apparel imports. The rate at which it has done so has, however, been uneven. In particular, the removal of quotas has favoured the ECE and`Med-12' countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey). Between 1991 and 1995 OPT quotas for the ECE grew at the rate of 36.2%, whereas those for Asia were growing at only 6.9% (Brugnoli and Resmini, 1996) . Quotas were also applied and utilised very differently across countries, depending on the particular niche they filled or the threat they posed to EU producers. By 1994 OPT quota utilization ranged from a low of 21.3% for Hungary to a high of 40.2% for the Czech Republic. By 1998 the EU had also eliminated all tariffs for ECE applicant states. For the rest of the world, the EU applies an average tariff of between 9.1% and 11.3% for apparel.
Such changes in trade regimes and their consequent and dramatic effects on the geography of the European apparel sector have been driven in part by the desire of the European Union to create a pan-European free-trade area. After the Barcelona Conference of 1995 the framework was set for a free-trade area that would include not only the ECE applicant states, but also the Med-12 (Bayar, 1998) . When fully implemented, this free-trade area will include between thirty and forty countries and 600 to 800 million people.
OPT trade quotas and tariff relief have, then, been a relatively short lived, but important, transition mechanism on the way to liberalization. OPT has been a political device for managing competing demand and complementing a broader vision of the greater Europe (enshrined in the Europe Agreements). However, perhaps its more significant and long-lasting implication is that the trade-regime forms of OPT have become the basis for establishing quite deep-seated production and contracting processes used by EU-based manufacturers and marketers to reduce their costs and enhance their profitability in highly competitive European markets through contracting production in ECE. It is to the forms that such production contracting take and their implications for possible upgrading of apparel production in ECE that we turn in the next section. European Union apparel buyers and the Europeanization of supply chains The growth of offshore production can be related to changes in global commodity chains (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994) . Bair and Gereffi (2002) , for example, have argued that buyers are the key drivers of change in a sector such as North American apparel. They suggest that several types of lead firms``drive the apparel commodity chain in North America: retailers, branded marketers, branded manufacturers, and textile companies. As apparel production has become globally dispersed and competition among these lead firms has intensified, each has responded with new strategies designed to strengthen its position in the commodity chain'' (Bair and Gereffi, 2002, page 34) . Retailers have internationalized their contracting networks, manufacturers are moving away from direct production and into higher value design and marketing activities, and textile firms are themselves beginning to move into apparel production. One of the major consequences of such strategies has been the hollowing out of apparel production in the USA, concomitant with the increasing presence of Mexican and other Central American (and Caribbean) producers exporting to the USA. Similar pressures have been experienced in the EU apparel market. Across the EU, retailers and buyers are internationalizing their sourcing strategies and manufacturers are relocating production. For example, in the United Kingdom, the apparel market has traditionally been dominated by a small number of relatively large retailers consisting of mid-market department store chains which account for over half of all apparel sales (Gibbon, 2001) . (8) Historically, these chains have sourced apparel from UK-based manufacturers and, to a lesser extent, manufacturers in Asia. The entry and increased role of new types of retailer, including discounters (such as Matalan and Primark), food retailers (such as Tesco and Asda), and foreign mid-market chains (such as H&M, The Gap, Zara, and Uniqlo), along with sluggish market growth have, however, intensified competition in the sector during the late 1990s. The loss of market share and the crisis engendered by increased competition has been seen most dramatically in two areas: first, in the restructuring of the sourcing strategies of the leading UK mid-market retailer, Marks and Spencer, and, second, the increasing consolidation of control and ownership in the sector, exhibited most recently in the purchase in 2002 of the large conglomerate Arcadia by Phillip Green, the current owner of Bhs. (9) Much of the reorientation of apparel sourcing has involved an internationalization of the supply chain, focused on Asia (notably China), North Africa, and ECE. One example of this dramatic reorientation of retailer supply chains in the UK market is that of the main high street retailer, Marks and Spencer. For Marks and Spencer, the 1998 release of trading figures highlighting a halving of year-on-year profits and a significant decline in market share resulted in the implementation of a dramatic restructuring strategy. A core element of the new strategy was the shift away from its traditional Made in England sourcing, in which 75% of garments were produced domestically by a range of British-owned, large, apparel manufacturers who had established long-term supply relations with Marks and Spencer. The dominance of domestic sourcing was replaced by a cost-reduction strategy centred on the internationalization of the supply chain; this currently involves some 75% of sourcing (8) In this section we draw upon a series of interviews by the authors with three of the major apparel retailers in the United Kingdom in 2001 and 2002, reflecting different market positions. Because of the anonymous nature of these interviews, we are not able to specify which retailers were involved. (9) Arcadia has also undergone divestment of several brand stores, including Warehouse, Principles, Hawkshead, and Racing Green, which leaves the group focused on Burton, Dorothy Perkins, Evans, Miss Selfridge, Topshop, Topman, and Wallis. from overseas. It has been estimated that internationalization of the supply chain has returned cost savings of roughly »320 millionöalongside a dramatic reduction in UK apparel-production employment Smith et al, 2002) .
Although this is a dramatic example, Marks and Spencer is not alone in expanding international sourcing arrangements. For example, Gibbon (2001) estimates that import penetration in the UK apparel sector increased from 47% of retail sales in 1995 to 65% of sales in 2000. Within this context of overall increased import penetration of the UK apparel market, producers in ECE have also increased their share. For example, the ECE6 increased their share of non-EU UK apparel imports from 4.8% to 11.8% between 1989 and 2000. Working directly through such internationalizing manufacturers, direct investments and joint ventures have been established in ECE to supply UK retailers directly. Invariably, a division of labour is established in which design and technical development is still undertaken in the United Kingdom, whereas production occurs elsewhere. The result has been a significant downsizing of production capacity and activity in the United Kingdom (see Dunford et al, 2002; Smith et al, 2002) .
Marks and Spencer represent only one strategy of British producers and retailers in responding to increased market penetration. For smaller retailers in particular, a second strategy has involved the use of agents within ECE to contract production directly with ECE-owned factories. Agents provide key quality-control and production-oversight roles, as smaller retailers who do not contract direct through UK-based manufacturers cannot hope to perform close monitoring functions. Equally, smaller runs of product lines may only provide part of an ECE factory's production profile, and so the management of particular orders within that wider profile requires local agents. Indeed, key factors in the establishment of contracting relations through agents are reliability in terms of delivery times, cost, and quality. Both of these strategies have, however, led to the same result: a reciprocal relationship between employment downsizing and the shift to more designintensive functions in the United Kingdom, alongside the expansion of outsourcing from and production in countries in ECE and elsewhere.
In Germany, large retail firms like C&A, Karlstadt, and Kaufhof followed comparable strategies, although they have been much more engaged in OPT-specific transactions with producers in ECE than have UK retailers and manufacturers. In order to circumvent OPT tariff-relief provisions that gave preference to manufacturers, the large German retailers simply passed production through a manufacturing firm (Pellegrin, 2001a; interview with Francesco Marchi, Euratex, February 2003) . In Italy, a relative latecomer to the expansion of contracting in ECE, firms have often worked closely with other nonItalian manufacturers who already had experience in ECE OPT-oriented production. As Graziani (1998) has argued, Italian textile firms responded to the pressures of the 1990s by acquiring downstream apparel firms with offshoring experience; much of the growth of apparel production for Italy in Romania and Bulgaria has been a direct consequence.
The emergence of deeper trade and production relations between ECE and EU countries has also more recently resulted in increasing levels of input substitution, as domestically produced textiles from ECE are used in assembly operations for export. Interviews suggest that input substitution is being driven in part by increasing levels of inward investment from EU producers in textile mills in ECE. It is certainly the case that locally produced textiles are being substituted for imported cloth in assembly operations (this is the case with Italian producers in Romania and the Czech Republic, for example), and some producers in ECE, either independently or in conjunction with EU firms, are moving towards more domestic full-package processing as the textile sector in the region undergoes quality improvementsödriven in part by inward investment.
There is also some evidence to suggest that certain producers in Slovakia are witnessing an improved position in the pan-European and domestic production networks (Smith, 2003) . Equally, long-established, former state-owned, enterprises have, in some cases, established a key role in the domestic ECE design market for apparelöa tendency evidenced by the growth of high-quality, medium-cost, factory-owned retail outlets in cities such as Bratislava and Prague (OP in the Czech Republic and Ozeta in Slovakia). In the case of OP's contracts with German retailers, for example,``transfer of know-how was ... taking place on a large scale. Not only could OP learn new designs either`by-doing' or through documentation Hugo Boss provided for the Moravian firm, [but OP] ... also benefited from more concrete advantages such as training for the workforce'' (Pellegrin, 2001a, page 67) .
This transfer of design capability has also enabled a few companies, such as OP, to establish non-OPT production agreements with UK retailers. Whether such transformations will provide the basis for ECE producers to move beyond the largely unequal and asymmetrical power relations involved in pan-European assembly contract production remains an open question. Equally, it is also possible that the geography of production in ECE will undergo further shifts to even lower cost parts of the region, such as Ukraine. Such further forms of restructuring reflect both the dynamism of processes of political^economic change in ECE and the constant transformation of the global apparel sector as it undergoes ever-deepening liberalization.
Conclusion
During the 1990s the ECE apparel sector has undergone a series of dramatic transformations. These are closely related to the changing strategies of EU-based retailers and buyers as they balance competing locational opportunities in the global economy within a context of intensive competition in domestic markets. They also reflect broader processes of globalization, not only as trade liberalization proceeds apace, but also in the specific conditions of established forms of contracting set up in the 1980s and of the creation of pan-European production networks.
In this paper we have emphasized two sets of processes that are key to understanding the changing geographies of these European apparel-sector transformations. First, we have argued that the dynamics of transformation in the ECE apparel sector must be understood within the context of the complexity of global and European regulatory forms, particularly those associated with trade regulations. These regulations first enabled a widening of participation of ECE apparel exports to the EU through outward processing trade arrangements. An increasingly liberalized regulatory environment has seen these embedded relationships transformed into`normal' trade relations. This liberalized environment is developing as part of the broader process of world trade reform, and the need to ensure that textile and apparel regulations converge with the broader GATT and WTO rules. We have emphasized some of the ways in which outward processing production arrangements are reshaping industrial activity within this more liberalized context, and we have explored some of the possible implications for upgrading.
Second, we have examined the role of retailer and buyer strategies in the EU in establishing particular forms of contracting relations with ECE producers. Within an increasingly competitive EU apparel retail market, buyers and chains have adopted a range of strategies that have enabled them to access production capacity in ECE and beyond. All of these transformations are ongoing, and further forms of restructuring should be expected. It is clear, however, that the development of ECE apparel production and trade have dramatically transformed particular regions involved in the sector throughout ECE (Begg et al, 1999; Pickles, 2002; Pickles and Begg, 2000; Smith, 2003) . What remains crucial, however, is to consider the longer term implications of this pan-European engagement and the extent to which ECE firms and communities are able to continue tò cut it' within the context of one of the world economy's most cost-sensitive sectors.
